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ABSTRACT
During the 1990s, many Russian non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) secured foreign
funding and participated in transnational advocacy networks. However, in the early 2000s,
Russian authorities attempted to regain control over foreign-funded NGOs’ activities, presenting
these NGOs as national security threats. The 2012 Russian Foreign Agents Law and the
resulting 2018 challenge before the European Court of Human Rights reflect contemporary
Russian political rhetoric that views Western governments and their agents, including NGOs, as
threats to Russian sovereignty and national security. However, legal challenges also de-politicize
the issues by forcing all parties into the framework of legal argument, reflecting the decline of
political pluralism in Russia. Revitalizing Russia’s civil and political landscapes requires a
thorough redefinition of national security, one that includes NGOs participating in transnational
advocacy networks as partners in providing security.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, many Russian non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) successfully secured foreign funding and
participated in transnational advocacy networks.1 However, in the early
2000s, Russian authorities expressed concern over foreign-funded
Miriam Matejova, Stefan Parker, & Peter Dauvergne, The Politics of
Repressing Environmentalists as Agents of Foreign Influence, 72 AUSTRALIAN J. INT’L AFF.
149 (2018). Transnational advocacy networks are characterized by the participation
of a variety of actors, such as “individuals, civic groups, international organizations
and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs),” etc., that interact with
each other around issues of common concern. Alexandra-Maria Bocşe,
“Understanding Transnational Advocacy Networks: How the Political Opportunity
Structure Impacts Their Emergence,” Proceedings of the Conference “EU Strategy for the
Danube Region. Conference on regional cooperation” organized by The Institute for the Danube
Region and Central Europe, Vienna, 15 December 2011, at 121 (citing David Held,
Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System, 20 ECON. & SOC’Y 138, 138–72
(1991)). Transnational advocacy networks include members “situated across state
borders and at least one actor in the network is a non-state agent. . . .” AlexandraMaria Bocşe, “Understanding Transnational Advocacy Networks: How the Political
Opportunity Structure Impacts Their Emergence,” Proceedings of the Conference “EU
Strategy for the Danube Region. Conference on regional cooperation” organized by The Institute for
the Danube Region and Central Europe, Vienna, 15 December 2011, at 121 (citing
Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Introduction, in
BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC
STRUCTURES, AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3–33 (Thomas Risse-Kappen
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995)).
1
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NGOs and “expressed a clear desire to regain control over the
activities of non-profit groups.”2 The Foreign Agents Law,3 enacted in
2012 and continually amended until 2016, reflects contemporary
Russian political rhetoric that views Western governments and their
agents, including NGOs, as attempting to undermine Russia’s ruling
regime and threatening national security.4 The Foreign Agents Law
requires domestic NGOs receiving foreign funding and participating
in political activities on the territory of the Russian Federation “to
register and advertise their status as ‘foreign agents.’”5 Many Russian
NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks that rely on
foreign funding due to lack of domestically available funds have been
stigmatized and, in some cases, forced to shut down as a result of the
law. The chilling effect created by the provisions of the Foreign Agents
Law impacts not only the relationship between NGOs and the state,
but also the very nature of governance and political pluralism in Russia.
It also arguably violates constitutionally established principles of
freedom of association and expression.
Part I of this article examines the reasons behind a global trend
towards enhancing governmental control over NGOs that receive
foreign funding and participate in transnational advocacy networks. It
looks at the intensification of nationalism within nation-states that are
forced to deal with geopolitical forces beyond their control, and the
international pressure on nation-states as a result of NGOs working in
cooperation with global partners. This part also discusses the role of
constitutional courts in shaping and reshaping the very concept of
national sovereignty and the impact of their reasoning on foreignFrançoise Daucé, The Duality of Coercion in Russia: Cracking Down on “Foreign
Agents,” 23 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA: J. POST-SOVIET DEMOCRATIZATION 57, 61 (2015).
3
See generally Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Otdel’nye
Zakonodatel’nye Akty Rossiskoi Federatsii v Chasti Regulirovaniya Deyatel’nosti
Nekommercheskikh Organizatsii, Vipolniyaiushikh Funktsii Innostrannovo Agenta
[Fed. Law of the Russian Fed’n on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the
Russian Fed’n Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial Org.s
Performing the Function of Foreign Agents], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS.
GAZ.] Jul 20, 2012, No. 121 [hereinafter “FOREIGN AGENTS LAW”].
4
Thomas M. Callahan, Cauldron of Unwisdom: The Legislative Offensive on
Insidious Foreign Influence in the Third Term of President Vladimir V. Putin, and ICCPR
Recourse for Affected Civil Advocates, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1219, 1221–22 (2015).
5
Id. at 1222 (quoting FOREIGN AGENTS LAW).
2
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funded NGOs. Part II outlines the overall legislative scheme created
by the 2012 Foreign Agents Law as well as amendments to the law.
This part also looks at some of the major criticisms of the law,
emphasizing the terms “foreign agent” and “political activity” as well
as the breadth of the foreign funding requirement.6 Due to the Russian
government’s assertion that the Russian Foreign Agents Law is
modeled on the United States Foreign Agents Registration Act
(“FARA”),7 this part examines both the 2014 decision by the Russian
Constitutional Court upholding the constitutionality of the regime
established by the Foreign Agents Law and the 1987 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Meese v. Keene dealing with the constitutionality of
certain provisions of FARA.8 Part III explores the key differences
between FARA and the Russian Foreign Agents Law, including the
overall purpose behind these pieces of legislation. This part also
highlights the similarities and differences between the majority and
dissenting opinions in the Russian and U.S. constitutional cases
discussed in Part II. Part IV of the article considers the impact of the
Russian Foreign Agents law on the development of Russian civil
society as well as on political governance. The article concludes that
legal challenges de-politicize these issues, reflecting the decline of
political pluralism in Russia. Finally, the article suggests the necessity
of a thorough rethinking of the notion of national security that
includes NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks as
partners in providing security.
I. NGOS AS TRANSLATORS OF GLOBAL STANDARDS
States around the world have been enacting various legislative
measures aimed at enhancing their control over NGOs that receive
funding from abroad and participate in transnational advocacy
6
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Otdel’nye Zakonodatel’nye
Akty Rossiskoi Federatsii v Chasti Regulirovaniya Deyatel’nosti Nekommercheskikh
Organizatsii, Vipolniyaiushikh Funktsii Innostrannovo Agenta [Fed. Law of the
Russian Fed’n on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Fed’n
Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial Org.s Performing the
Function of Foreign Agents], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Jul 20, 2012, No.
121.
7
22 U.S.C. ch.11, subch. II § 611 et. seq.
8
See generally Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
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networks.9 Governments frequently frame these measures as attempts
to encourage transparency in national political debates and to increase
national security, but the activities of NGOs receiving foreign funding
have been portrayed in many instances as unpatriotic, undermining
state sovereignty and opposing domestic interests.10 This threatening
portrayal of foreign-funded NGOs in part reflects the “‘intensification
of nationalism within nation-states’” dealing with increasing demands
for acceptance of international norms, and the struggle of nations to
“‘impose order upon geopolitical forces beyond their locus of
control.’”11 This global trend towards delegitimizing NGOs with
foreign funding is partially driven by two factors: (1) the pressure that
NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks place on their
domestic governments and (2) the construction of national identities
in the face of globalism through discourses of inclusion and exclusion
that reinforce and emphasize distinctions between “insiders and
outsiders.”12 On a number of occasions, NGOs with global partners
have utilized international exposure and the resulting international
pressure to generate domestic momentum for reform.13 This NGO
strategy of “[t]hrowing a boomerang” to find international partners has
influenced “local social and political dynamics, altering the relationship
between domestic NGOs and the state, sometimes shifting the
domestic balance of power.”14
However, the impact of transnational advocacy networks
extends beyond pressuring local governments regarding issue-specific
causes. It is within these transnational networks that global standards
and practices are often developed and shaped. Domestic NGOs
See generally Miriam Matejova, Stefan Parker, & Peter Dauvergne, The Politics
of Repressing Environmentalists as Agents of Foreign Influence, 72 AUSTRALIAN J. INT’L AFF.
145 (2018).
10
See LINCOLN A. MITCHELL, THE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION PARADOX 98
(Brookings Inst. Press 2016).
11
Anna Popkova, Global Partners or International Spies? A Comparative Analysis
of the Russian Media’s Coverage of the Law on ‘Foreign Agents,’ 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3062,
3063 (2016) (quoting Ryan J. Thomas & Mary Grace Antony, Competing Constructions
of British National Identity: British Newspaper Comment on the 2012 Olympics Opening
Ceremony, 37 MEDIA CULTURE & SOC’Y 493, 494 (2015)).
12
Popkova, supra note 11, at 3063–64.
13
See Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 147.
14
Id.
9
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frequently serve as “sites of implementation,” actively engaging in the
“transferring, adopting and adjusting of global standards to local
practices. . . .”15
Furthermore, it can be argued that the role of NGOs in
transnational advocacy networks is not limited to serving as simple
conduits of externally-developed standards, but rather involves
domestic NGOs actively contributing to shaping these global
standards. For example, a grant awarded by an international
organization to a domestic NGO makes the donor and the NGOs codesigners who mutually influence and transform each other’s practices
and ideas.16 In other words, “[t]hrough grants, donors introduce
policies and standards related to democracy, stakeholder governance,
civil rights, and environmental protection that may be new to the
domestic political sphere. These policies are not necessarily supported
by national governments.”17
States under pressure due to the direction of attention towards
a specific violation, or more generally due to constant highlighting of
systemic issues, frequently do not react favorably to such efforts by
NGOs.18 Nation-states may view NGOs that focus on issues including
human rights law, environmental law, and international criminal law as
enabling challengers to states’ exercise of power and monopoly on
violence, thus challenging the very notion of state sovereignty.19
Therefore, because NGO-generated and supported transnational
pressure may result in domestic policy changes—or at least changes in
rhetoric to satisfy the international community—threatened states start
to view such foreign-funded NGOs as “seditious” and even as threats
to national security.20 While states are frequently eager to portray
international legal norms, human rights principles, and NGOs working
15
Maria Tysiachniouk, Svetlana Tulaeva, & Laura A. Henry, Civil Society under
the Law ‘On Foreign Agents’: NGO Strategies and Network Transformation, 70 EUROPEASIA STUD. 615, 632 (2018).
16
See id. at 618.
17
Id. at 619.
18
Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 147.
19
Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Sovereignty of International Law?, 67
UNIV. TORONTO L. J. 496, 507, 510 (2017).
20
Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 147.
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to advance them as undermining national sovereignty, the actual
relationship between international law—including human rights law—
and state sovereignty is more nuanced. International law must
ultimately operate in part inside the nation-state.21 This operation
inside the nation-state and its foundation in national institutions and
practices “‘lends it a distinctive power and legitimacy.’”22 Thus, the
interplay of international norms and domestic sovereignty concerns is
not one between purely oppositional forces, for states contribute to
the shaping and legitimizing of international principles and practices.
Furthermore, because some governments may be unable to satisfy
many of their citizens’ needs, affected citizens may seek help from
various NGOs. Thus, NGOs often become a vital link between
citizens and their governments.23 National security—that is, security
from outside threats as well as domestic economic, ecological, and
social security—can be a joint effort of both governmental and nongovernmental organizations,24 but NGOs may have the advantage in
enabling citizens to communicate with their governments more
effectively. By working to address a multitude of social problems,
NGOs become a way—indeed, sometimes the only way—for popular
complaints to reach public officials.25 However, this connection with
the public, combined with participation in transnational advocacy
networks and receipt of foreign funds, may foster suspicion among
governmental organizations against NGOs.26 The combination of
foreign funding, connectivity to global norms, and ability to shape

Irina Ceric, The Sovereign Charter: Security, Territory and the Boundaries of
Constitutional Rights, 44 OTTAWA L. REV. 353, 373 (2012–13) (quoting SASKIA SASSEN,
LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 65 (Columbia
Univ. Press 1996)).
22
Id.
23
Denis V. Iroshnikov, “Vzaimodeistvie Organiv Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti s
Obschestvennymi Ob’edineniyami v Tselyah Obespechaniya Natsionalnoi
Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Uridicheskya Nauka (2012) 3 at 18.
24
Id. at 22.
25
Pavel Petrovich Fantrov, Nekommercheskie Organizatsii I Sistema
Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti v Rossii: Rol’ Nepravitel’stvennyh Ob’edinenii, Imeuschih Status
Inostrannogo Agenta, 18:303 UGROZY I BEZOPASNOST 59, 59 (2015).
26
Id. at 58.
21
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public opinion underpins the discourse of NGOs as threats to national
security and undermining state sovereignty.27
Despite the complex and intertwined nature of the relationship
between state sovereignty, national security, international norms, and
NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks, the work of
increasingly prominent domestic NGOs around the world is being
presented by domestic governments as challenging state sovereignty
and catering to foreign interests, especially when it comes to human
rights.28 Domestic legislative measures seemingly aimed at increasing
transparency and ensuring national security by effectively reducing
NGOs’ access to foreign funding create fractures in domestic civil
society29 and de-politicize NGOs by reducing their contact with
foreign partners and participation in transnational advocacy
frameworks.30 In addition to creating legal barriers between domestic
NGOs and other actors in a transnational network, governmental
“‘regulatory offensive[s]’”31 contribute to the growth of informal
practices (such as operating without registration or ending formal legal
status entirely) between domestic NGOs, their international and
domestic partners, and state officials, placing NGOs’ work into a “grey
area” of uncertainty.32 While informality may aid in avoiding
administrative penalties, NGOs operating informally cannot be as
effective in their interactions with state agencies, and are thus unable
to participate in governance effectively, further contributing to the depoliticization of NGOs and the reduction of their policy footprint.33

Id. at 63.
See Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 148.
29
Being designated as a “foreign agent” may result in other members of civil
society (such as NGOs that do not accept foreign funding) being reluctant to engage
with foreign funded NGOs, despite common causes pursued by both foreign funded
and domestically funded NGOs, creating fractures in domestic civil society.
Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, & Henry, supra note 15, at 625.
30
Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 155.
31
Id. at 148 (quoting Kendra E. Dupuy, James Ron, & Aseem Prakash, Who
Survived? Ethiopia’s Regulatory Crackdown on Foreign-Funded NGOs, 22 REV. INT’L POL.
ECON. 419, 420, 423 (2015)).
32
Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, & Henry, supra note 15, at 630.
33
NGOs choosing informality as a strategy and operating without official
legal registration can no longer participate in public hearings, offer expertise to
27
28
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Domestic governments are deliberately attempting to
“reconstitute[] the human rights field as a national security threat.”34 As a result,
NGOs, especially those concerned with human rights, are increasingly
scrutinized on national security grounds.35 The work of NGOs,
especially when this work is connected with challenging the existing
social contract between the state and its citizens, is gradually framed as
an existential threat.36 The issues are discussed “‘either as a special kind
of politics or as above politics,’ which paves the way for exceptional
intervention that may violate normal legal and social rules.” 37 Once this
reframing is adopted and legitimized in the eyes of the public, the
actual “threat” posed by the work of NGOs with foreign funding and
links to transnational advocacy networks becomes irrelevant.38 Issues
of national identity and national values then become closely linked with
discourses of needing to oppose foreign threats or influences, creating
a “state of psychological siege,” with NGOs caught in the midst of this
political standoff.39 Perpetuating the rhetoric of needing to respond to
foreign threats and “keeping the population in ‘survival mode’”
becomes essential to the survival of the domestic regime itself. 40
Due to the complexity of the relationship between
governmental and non-governmental organizations, constitutional
courts play an increasingly significant role in negotiating these
“contested legal spaces. . . .”41 In a way, constitutional courts have
government officials or work on public councils. Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, & Henry,
supra note 15, at 629, 634.
34
Neve Gordon, Human Rights as a Security Threat: Lawfare and the Campaign
against Human Rights NGOs, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 311, 312 (2014). “In Canada,
China, India, Israel . . . [and] Russia . . . governments are cracking down on foreignfunded NGOs” that operate within their jurisdictions. Lawrence Solomon, Lawrence
Solomon: The Worldwide Crackdown on NGOs, FINANCIAL POST (May 18, 2015, 4:14
PM),
https://business.financialpost.com/opinion/lawrence-solomon-theworldwide-crackdown-on-ngos.
35
Gordon as Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 317 (quoting BARRY BUZAN & LENE HANSEN, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009)).
38
Jardar Ostbo, Securitizing ‘Spiritual-Moral Values’ in Russia, 33 POST-SOVIET
AFF. 200, 202 (2017).
39
Id. at 212.
40
Id. at 213.
41
Ceric, supra note 21, at 368.
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become intimately involved in constructing “the juridical framework
of national sovereignty.”42 In states hostile to NGOs’ involvement in
transnational advocacy networks, constitutional courts frequently use
powerful tools like “proportionality” to determine whether state
measures are both (1) “necessary” in a democratic society and (2)
proportional to the aims of transparency and national security.43 In
other words, while the courts acknowledge that proportionality is key
when striking a balance between human rights and national security,44
the way that various stages of proportionality analysis are presented
makes it clear that both national governments and constitutional courts
often view national security as a necessary precondition for the state
to guarantee human rights protections.45 It is pointed out that a balance
between human rights and national security is jurisdictional as well as
time-specific, and that there are no “universal standards” when it
comes to striking such a balance.46 Thus, limiting a right is not
necessarily the same as violating a right.47 While a government’s
attempts to assert greater control over NGOs that receive foreign
funding may reduce or even eliminate services provided by NGOs,
concerns of sovereignty and narrowly defined national security take
precedence.48 Throughout this process, constitutional courts become
complicit in delegitimizing NGOs.49 Thus, constitutional courts may
not only reduce democratic pluralism but may also decrease human
rights protections and citizens’ contributions to political governance.

Id.
Gregoire C.N. Webber, Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional
Rights Scholarship, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 179, 198 (2010).
44
Sergei U. Chapchikov, Problemy Formirovaniya Konstitutsionnoi Doktriny
Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1 PROBELY V ROSSIISKOM
ZAKONODATEL’STVE 17 (2012).
45
A.V. Tulikov, Obespechenie Informatsionnoi Bezopasnosti kak Garantiya Prav
Cheloveka, 2 PRAVO. ZHURNAL VYSSCHEI SHKOLY EKONOMIKI , 57 (2015).
46
V.A. Nomokonov, Prava Cheloveka I Natsional’naya Bezopasnost, 2:4
CRIMINOLOGICHESKII ZHURNAL OGUEP, 5-6 (2008).
47
Id. at 8.
48
Fantrov, supra note 25, at 63.
49
Ceric, supra note 21, at 370 states that constitutional jurisprudence has the
capacity to “catalyse[] direct acts of sovereignty by the state.”
42
43
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II. RUSSIAN CRACKDOWN ON FOREIGN-FUNDED NGOS
Beginning in the early 2000s, the Russian government became
progressively concerned over the activities of foreign-funded NGOs,
claiming that these NGOs were harming Russian national security
interests and that their campaigns were “initiated by foreign
intelligence agencies” aiming to overthrow the current Russian
regime.50 Suspicions only increased after the 2011–12 public protests
regarding the violation of voting procedures during the Russian
presidential election.51 The authorities viewed these massive protests
as sponsored by the West and designed to effect regime change.52
Thus, these “Western influence[s]” and those who supported them
became associated with “undermin[ing] the country from within.”53
Legislation aimed at suppressing the work of NGOs receiving
foreign funding has to be contextualized within a broader policy of the
Russian government directed at the “‘nationalization of elites’”54 and
reasserting its sovereignty and importance on the global stage,
particularly as relations with the West continued to deteriorate. The
Russian government’s attempts to discredit foreign-funded NGOs
accords with the Russian government’s conception of Russian national
identity as antagonistic to Western values 55 and instead grounded in

50
See generally Sergei Vasilevich Ustinkin et al., Otsenka Vozdeistviya
Nepravitelstvennyh Organizatsii na Izbiratelnyi Protesess v Rossii, 7 VLAST 28, 28–29 (2016).
51
Popkova, supra note 11, at 3067.
52
Pavel Romanov & Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, ‘Foreign Agents’ in the Field of
Social Policy Research: The Demise of Civil Liberties and Academic Freedom in Contemporary
Russia, 25 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y 359, 362 (2015).
53
Id.
54
“‘[N]ationalization of elites’” is a policy of the Putin administration
designed to reduce the odds of public servants and politicians having interests in
foreign jurisdictions. Lester M. Salamon, Vladimir M. Benevolenski, & Lev I.
Jakobson, Penetrating the Dual Realities of Government – Nonprofit Relations in Russia, 26
VOLUNTAS 2178, 2206–07, 2210 (2015). An example of this policy is a law banning
government officials from owning financial assets abroad. Id. at 2206. The
“nationalization” extends beyond government officials and includes prominent
members of civil society. See id. at 2206–07. Russian federal “Foreign Agents” law is
part of this policy. Id. at 2210.
55
Popkova, supra note 11, at 3065.
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traditional Russian values. 56 Thus, critically examining the
government’s framing of its legislative measures is key to
understanding what these measures are truly aiming to accomplish.
On July 20, 2012, the Russian government passed a federal law
“On Foreign Agents” that significantly constrained the financial,
communication, and administrative operations of NGOs receiving
foreign funding and participating in transnational advocacy networks.57
Under the 2012 law, NGOs must register with the Justice Ministry as
“foreign agents”58 if they receive funding from foreign sources
(government or private) and engage, “including in the interests of
foreign principals,” in “political activity” taking place on the territory
of the Russian Federation.59 The Foreign Agents Law defines “political
activity” very broadly to cover almost all aspects of advocacy and
human rights work:
[a] non-commercial organization60 is considered to
carry out political activity on the territory of the
Russian Federation if, regardless of its statutory goals
and purposes stated in its founding documents, it
participates (including through financing) in organizing
and implementing political actions aimed at influencing
decision-making by state bodies intended for the
change of state policy pursued by them, as well as in

56
Alexandra V. Orlova, Privatizing Homosexuality: Russia’s Reassertion of ‘Moral
Sovereignty’ over Gay Rights, 11 HUM. RTS, & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 122, 176 (2017).
57
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Otdel’nye Zakonodatel’nye
Akty Rossiskoi Federatsii v Chasti Regulirovaniya Deyatel’nosti Nekommercheskikh
Organizatsii, Vipolniyaiushikh Funktsii Innostrannovo Agenta [Fed. Law of the
Russian Fed’n on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Fed’n
Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial Org.s Performing the
Function of Foreign Agents], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Jul 20, 2012, No.
121.
58
Id. Art. 1(1).
59
Id. Art. 2(2).
60
NGOs are included in the term “non-commercial organization,” see
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Nekommercheskih Organizatsiyah [Fed. Law of the Russian
Fed’n on Non-Profit Organizations of the Russian Fed’n], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA
[ROS. GAZ.] Jan 12, 1996, as amended on Feb., 11, 2013, No. 7, Art.3, 4 and 6.
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the shaping of public opinion for the aforementioned
purposes. 61
The Foreign Agents Law places additional administrative
burdens on NGOs that have been designated as foreign agents, such
as mandating separate accounts for funds from local and foreign
sources, submitting biannual activity reports, quarterly reports on
spending, and annual audits.62 The Foreign Agents Law also prescribed
a number of criteria for conducting additional unscheduled audits of
“foreign agent” NGOs.63
Initially, the Foreign Agents Law required all NGOs that met
the criteria prescribed in the law to register with the Ministry of Justice
and to label all of their materials as produced by “foreign agents,” 64
with administrative penalties for failure to comply. 65 When most
Russian NGOs refused to voluntarily register as “foreign agents” with
the Justice Ministry, the Russian parliament amended the Foreign
Agents Law to authorize the Justice Ministry to register NGOs as
“foreign agents” without their consent.66 On November 24, 2014,
additional amendments to the Foreign Agents Law prohibited political
parties from concluding contracts with NGOs designated as “foreign
agents,” and NGOs registered as “foreign agents” were also prohibited
from “participating in other ways in the electoral and referendum
campaigns.”67 Moreover, in May 2016, further amendments expanded

Izmenenii Iulya 20, 2012 (Amendments dated Jul 20, 2012), Art. 2(2).
Id. Art. 2(5).
63
Id. Art. 2(5).
64
Id. Art. 2(4).
65
Id. Art. 3(2).
66
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Stat’iu 32 Federal’nogo
Zakona “O Nekommercheskikh Organizatsiyakh” [Federal Law of the Russian
Federation on Amendments to Article 32 of Federal Law on Non-commercial
Organizations”], SISTEMA GARANT [SYSTEM GARANT] Jun 4, 2014, No. 147, Art.
1.
67
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Otdel’nye Zakonodatel’nye
Akty Rossiskoi Federatsii po Voprosu Finansovoyi Otchetnosti Politicheskikh Partii,
Izbiratel’nikh Obyedinenii, Kandidatov na Vyborakh v Organy Gosudarstvennoi
Vlasti I Mestnogo Samovupravleniya [Fed. Law of the Russian Fed’n on
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Fed’n on the Question of
Fin. Reporting of Political Parties, Electoral Ass’ns, Candidates in the Elections of
61
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the controversial definition of “political activity” to include almost all
forms of public action undertaken by NGOs.68 While the new
amendments still reference “influencing decision-making of state
bodies” and “shaping of public opinion,” they also identify areas in
which participating is deemed “political activity,” including state
building, national security, constitutional order, foreign policy, socioeconomic and national development, development of the political
system, and legislative regulation of human rights and freedoms.69
Other activities now deemed to be “political” include, among other
things, participation in and organization of public functions (e.g.,
meetings, demonstrations, pickets); organization of and participation
in public debates and discussions; election monitoring; public petitions
directed to state bodies and actions directed at influencing the activities
of these bodies, including lobbying for legal change; and shaping of
public opinion through public opinion or sociological surveys. 70
The government’s choice of the term “foreign agent” to
describe NGOs receiving foreign funding and engaging in “political
activity” has faced criticism both domestically and internationally. 71
The term “foreign agent” in Russian political and popular discourses
often suggests association with spies and traitors.72 Thus, using the
term “foreign agent” stigmatizes and ostracizes NGOs participating in
transnational advocacy networks73 and silences those who criticize

State Auth.s and Local Gov’ts], SISTEMA GARANT [SYSTEM GARANT], Nov. 24,
2014, No. 355, Art. 1(2).
68
Proekt Federal’nogo Zakona RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Stat’iu 8
Federaln’nogo Zakona “Ob Obshestvennyikh Obyiedzineniakh” I Stat’iu 2
Federal’nogo Zakona “O Nekommercheskikh Organizatsiiakh,” [Draft the Fed. Law
of the Russian Fed’n on Amendments to Article 8 of the Fed. Law on Public Ass’ns
and Article 2 of the Fed. Law on Non-Commercial Org.], No. 1000884-6. Art. 2.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 151.
72
N.A. Kupina, Ideologema ‘Inostrannyi Agent’: Tri Dnya v Iule 2012 Goda, 3(41)
Politicheskaya Lingvistika 43, 44 (2012).
73
Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights on the Legislation of
the Russian Federation on Non-Commercial Organizations in Light of Council of
Europe Standards, Strasbourg, CommDH (2013) 15, July 15, 2013 at ¶ 57.
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governmental policies.74 In other words, the connotations of the term
“foreign agent” belie the law’s true aim: revealing “enemies within.”75
Indeed, this label created divisions within the Russian NGO
community itself between NGOs receiving foreign funds and those
not receiving such funds, with the latter being reluctant to cooperate
with the former.76 In fact, many NGOs chose to cease operations
rather than operate under the label “foreign agent.”77
Problematic naming aside, the key criteria for an NGO to be
labelled as a “foreign agent” include receipt of foreign funding and
participation in “political activities.”78 Both of these criteria must be
present,79 and both of these criteria pose problems.
First, the criteria of receipt of money and other property from
foreign sources is exceptionally broad and can cover almost any type
of transactions with foreign funds, from payment for contracts or
membership dues to a single monetary donation, receipt of office
equipment, or financial award for winning a competition.80 The types
of foreign funds are not restricted and can include payments from
individuals, organizations, or governments.81 Additionally, neither the
amount nor the purpose of the payments are prescribed by the law. 82
Thus, a small individual donation from abroad can trigger the
requirements of the Foreign Agents Law if the NGO receiving such a

74
Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Legislation and Practice
in the Russian Federation on Non-Commercial Organizations in Light of Council of
Europe Standards: An Update, Strasbourg, CommDH (2015) 17, July 9, 2015 at ¶
70.
75
Kupina, supra note 72, at 46.
76
Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights concerning Case
N.9988/13 Ekozaschita and Others v. Russia and 48 other complaints, Strasbourg,
CommDH (2017) 22, July 5, 2017 at ¶ 34.
77
Kupina, supra note 72, at 47.
78
A.A. Kashin, Status Inostrannogo Agenta, 21: 309 BUHGALTER I ZAKON 17,
17 (2012).
79
Id.
80
A.I. Vasilenko, Prinyatie Zakona ‘Ob Inostrannyh Agentah’ Kak Pervyi Etap na
Puti k Pravovomu Regulirovaniu Lobbistskoi Deyatelnosti v Rossii, 3:25 VESTNIK
PERMSKOGO UNIVERSITETA 44, 46 (2014).
81
Kashin, supra note 78, at 18.
82
Id. at 19.

396

2019

"Foreign Agents," Sovereignty, and Political Pluralism

7:2

donation participates in “political activity,” whether or not the money
from such a donation was used to fund “political activity.”83
The case of Russia’s major independent pollster, the Levada
Center, illustrates the problematic nature of the provisions of the
Foreign Agents Law. For twenty-eight years, the Levada Center has
been one of the most important and respected research institutes in
Russia,84 but the Levada Center was designated as a “foreign agent” by
the Russian Justice Ministry in September of 2016.85 This designation
came two weeks ahead of the Russian parliamentary election and
resulted in the Center ceasing publication of its polling results prior to
the election, despite having conducted similar polling since 1991. 86 The
Levada Center unsuccessfully argued that all of the foreign funds it
received were not used for any “political activity,” but were instead
used to conduct market surveys.87 Nevertheless, the Center’s
sociological activity was equated with “political activity.”88
The definition of “political activity” has been criticized as
overly vague, as almost any NGO activity that aims to influence public
opinion or governmental decision-making processes by calling for
changes to government policies has been defined as engagement in
political activity. 89 Such an expansive definition of political activity
arguably goes against one of the primary functions of NGOs as

Id. at 18.
I ‘Levadu’ Poschitali, KOMMERSANT.RU (05.09.2016, 22:49)
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3081977 (last visited March 13, 2019).
85
Daria Skibo, Five Years of Russia’s Foreign Agents Law, OPENDEMOCRACY
(Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/five-years-of-russia-sforeign-agent-law/.
86
I ‘Levadu’ Poschitali, supra note 84.
87
Ekaterina Grobman, Sotsiologam Zachitali Interviu, KOMMERSANT.RU,
(19.11.2016)
available
at
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3148363?from=doc%20_%20vrez (last visited
March 13, 2019).
88
I ‘Levadu’ Poschitali, supra note 84.
89
See Art. 2(2). See Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, & Henry, supra note 15, at 621.
83
84
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“watchdogs” that aid in the review, critique, and exchange of ideas on
all matters of public interest.90
Additionally, Russian courts have classified holding
roundtables and conferences to discuss government policy; publishing
policy analysis documents, textbooks, or academic articles; and even
handing out needles and condoms as part of HIV/AIDS prevention
as participation in “political activity.”91 Indeed, it seems that the only
way for a foreign-funded NGO to avoid falling within the scope of the
law is to either agree with government policies or cease accepting
foreign funding.92 For many Russian NGOs engaged in human rights
work, e.g., LGBT advocacy, funding from domestic sources is simply
not available due to lack of popular support for these causes. 93
Other issues with the Foreign Agents Law emerged as soon as
the law came into effect. Some of these issues included a lack of clarity
with regards to when administrative penalties will be applied to NGOs,
as well as the retroactive application of the law, where decisions
regarding participation in “political activities” were made based on the
past activities of an organization or simply because the NGO had
previously received foreign financing.94 Domestic courts were also
reluctant to assess all of the factual circumstances surrounding the
designation of NGOs as “foreign agents” thoroughly; instead, they
tended to take information provided by the Ministry of Justice or the
prosecutors at face value.95 Furthermore, domestic courts frequently
90
Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Legislation and Practice
in the Russian Federation on Non-Commercial Organizations in Light of Council of
Europe Standards: An Update, Strasbourg, CommDH (2015) 17, July 9, 2015 at ¶ 9.
91
Vasilenko, supra note 80 at 47; See also Spravka po itogam obobshceniya
sudebnoi praktiki po delam, voznikauschim iz publichnyh pravootnoshenii,
svyazannym s primeneniem zakonodatelstva, reguliruuschego deyatelnost
nekommercheskih organizatsii, vypolnyauschih funktsii inostrannogo agenta,
October 20, 2016 (N.4-VS-7535/16).
92
Kashin, supra note 78, at 21-22.
93
See Romanov and Iarskaia-Smirnova, supra note 52, at 363.
94
Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights on the Legislation of
the Russian Federation on Non-Commercial Organizations in Light of Council of
Europe Standards, Strasbourg, CommDH (2013) 15, July 15, 2013 at ¶ 48.
95
Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Legislation and Practice
in the Russian Federation on Non-Commercial Organizations in Light of Council of
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conflated “political activity” pursued by leaders of NGOs in their
personal capacities with the activities of the organization itself,
improperly attributing the activities of the leader to the organization.96
A. Russian Constitutional Court Decision N.10-P (2014)
On April 8, 2014, the Russian Constitutional Court held that
the Foreign Agents Law complies overall with the Russian
Constitution.97 The majority of the Russian Constitutional Court
Justices acknowledged that freedom of association constitutes one of
the fundamental freedoms in a democracy and ensures ideological and
political pluralism.98 Guaranteeing this fundamental freedom is a
responsibility of the state prescribed in the Russian Constitution,
Article 30(1), as well as in various international instruments signed and
ratified by the Russian Federation, including Article 11 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 99 Nevertheless,
freedom of association may be limited, as long as those limitations are
undertaken for a legitimate governmental purpose and the means
chosen are proportional to such a purpose.100 The role of the
Constitutional Court is to strike an appropriate balance. 101
The majority held that the designation of “foreign agent” as
applied to qualifying NGOs does not mean that designated
organizations constitute a national security threat, even if they act as
agents of foreign principals.102 Hence, the majority of the Court opined
that any attempts to equate the meaning of the phrase “foreign agent”
with outdated stereotypes prevalent in Soviet times are groundless
because the phrase “foreign agent” does not carry negative
Europe Standards: An Update, Strasbourg, CommDH (2015) 17, July 9, 2015 at ¶
53.
96
Id. at ¶ 58.
97
Po Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionosti Polodzenii Punkta 6 Stat’yi 2 i
Punkta 7 Stat’yi 32 Federal’nogo Zakona [On the Matter of Constitutionality of Art.
2(6) and Art. 32(7) of the Fed. Law], Konst. Sud RF [RF Const. Court] 2014, No.
10, ¶ 3.4.
98
Id. at ¶ 2.
99
Id. at ¶ 2.
100
Id. at ¶ 2.
101
Id. at ¶ 2.
102
Id. at ¶ 3.1.
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connotations.103 The majority reasoned that due to Russia’s extensive
participation in the global community, the mere fact that an NGO
receives foreign funds and participates in political activities cannot in
and of itself constitute evidence of the disloyalty of such organizations
to the Russian state.104 Thus, the legislative construction of the term
“foreign agent” does not presuppose a negative assessment of such
organizations by the Russian state and cannot be taken as evidence of
distrust or intent to discredit such organizations or their activities by
the state.105
Additionally, the majority opined that in order to qualify
actions of NGOs as political activity, actions “must be intended to
influence decision-making by state bodies or influence state policy
directly or by shaping public opinion.”106 In other words, an action may
be political if it elicits a significant public response or attracts the
attention of state bodies or civil society to the issue in question.107 The
majority stated that political activities may include, but are not limited
to, the following: public gatherings, demonstrations, marches,
picketing, political agitation in the context of elections and referenda,
public speeches to state bodies, and dissemination of opinions
pertaining to decisions taken by authorities.108 The Court also observed
that the existence of NGOs peacefully propagating ideas that are
critical of governmental policies or that contradict popular opinion
constitutes a “cornerstone of democratic society.”109
The Court held that the regime for voluntary registration as a
“foreign agent” established by the Foreign Agents Law did not prevent
NGOs from seeking or receiving foreign funding or from carrying out
political activities within the Russian Federation, and thus was not

Id. at ¶ 3.1.
Id. at ¶ 3.1.
105
Id. at ¶ 3.1.
106
Po Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionosti Polodzenii Punkta 6 Stat’yi 2 i
Punkta 7 Stat’yi 32 Federal’nogo Zakona [On the Matter of Constitutionality of Art.
2(6) and Art. 32(7) of the Fed. Law], Konst. Sud RF [RF Const. Court] 2014, No.
10, ¶ 3.3.
107
Id. at ¶ 3.3.
108
Id. at ¶ 3.2.
109
Id. at ¶ 3.1.
103
104
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discriminatory.110 The majority reasoned that the registration regime
did not result in differential treatment between NGOs that receive
foreign funding and those that do not.111 The registration requirements
were instituted to ensure the transparency of NGOs’ work and were
not aimed at interfering in their activities.112 Registration requirements
were also meant to protect Russian sovereignty by preventing foreignfunded NGOs from influencing Russian policies in the interests of
foreign principals.113
The majority stated that neither the amount nor the type of
foreign financing was prescribed in order to avoid undue discretion
when applying this criterion.114
The Court also held that NGOs had a right of judicial review
when it came to a designation as “foreign agent,” and the burden of
proof remained on the authorities.115 Despite challenging some
mandatory minimum administrative fines as unconstitutional, 116 the
majority concluded that provisions of the Foreign Agents Law were
constitutional.117
The judgment of the Constitutional Court contains a
dissenting opinion by Justice Yaroslavtsev; he concluded that
provisions of the Foreign Agents Law were not constitutional.118
Justice Yaroslavtsev reasoned that the idea behind the constitutionally
protected right of freedom of association is to enable each and every
citizen to participate in the civil and political life of the state.119 Hence,
Id. at ¶ 3.2.
Id. at ¶ 3.2.
112
Id. at ¶ 3.2.
113
Id. at ¶ 3.2.
114
Id. at ¶ 3.3.
115
Po Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionosti Polodzenii Punkta 6 Stat’yi 2 i
Punkta 7 Stat’yi 32 Federal’nogo Zakona [On the Matter of Constitutionality of Art.
2(6) and Art. 32(7) of the Fed. Law], Konst. Sud RF [RF Const. Court] 2014, No.
10, ¶ 3.2.
116
Id. at ¶ 4.2.
117
Id. at ¶ 3.4.
118
Id. at ¶ 1. (Osoboe Mnenie Suda V.G. Yaroslavtseva [Dissenting Opinion
of Justice V.G. Yaroslavtsev]).
119
Id. at ¶ 1.
110
111
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citizens holding strong political views are able to increase their
participation in political governance through participation in NGOs.120
Thus, participation of NGOs in the development and realization of
governmental policies constitutes a normal practice of interaction
between civil society and the state.121
Moreover, freedom of association cannot be fully realized
without NGOs being able to attract financing for their activities from
all sources not prohibited by law.122 Justice Yaroslavtsev reasoned that
according to the European Court of Human Rights, pluralism
constitutes one of the “hallmarks” of democracy, and plurality of
opinions may be expressed by individuals joining NGOs dedicated to
particular causes.123 Nevertheless, Justice Yaroslavtsev stated that
freedom of association is not absolute and can be limited in a
democratic society to the extent necessary for specific purposes, such
as health, constitutional order, morality, and national security.124
However, the federal legislator125 must ensure that this constitutionally
protected right is limited to the minimum extent possible, without such
limitations “hollowing out” the core of the constitutionally protected
right and making it meaningless.126
The Foreign Agents Law created a special group of NGOs:
those acting as “foreign agents.”127 However, the federal legislation
does not require an “agency relationship” to exist between a foreignfunded NGO and a foreign principal.128 Requirements for registering
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 1.
122
Id. at ¶ 1.
123
Id. at ¶ 1.
124
Id. at ¶ 1.
125
In Russia, the Federal Assembly consists of the Duma (the lower house)
and the Federation Council (the upper house) – see The State Duma. The Federal
Assembly of the Russian Federation, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/28319/ (last
visited March 25, 2019).
126
Osoboe Mnenie [Dissenting Opinion], supra note 118, ¶ 1.
127
Po Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionosti Polodzenii Punkta 6 Stat’yi 2 i
Punkta 7 Stat’yi 32 Federal’nogo Zakona [On the Matter of Constitutionality of Art.
2(6) and Art. 32(7) of the Fed. Law], Konst. Sud RF [RF Const. Court] 2014, No.
10, ¶ 3.1.
128
Id. at ¶ 3.1.
120
121
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as a “foreign agent” include receipt of funding from foreign sources
and engaging in “political activity,” “including in the interests of
foreign principals,” on the territory of the Russian Federation.129
Hence, it is apparent from the wording of the legislation that acting in
the interests of foreign principals is not mandatory.130
Furthermore, Justice Yaroslavtsev reasoned that certain terms
contained in the Foreign Agents Law, such as “political actions” and
“shaping of public opinion,” are vague. 131 Both NGOs and law
enforcement officials must determine whether the NGO is shaping
public opinion on a case by case basis.132 Additionally, the Foreign
Agents Law does not specify with any level of certainty which activities
can be classified as “political.”133 Thus, instead of greater transparency,
the Foreign Agents Law has achieved the reverse effect.134
The Foreign Agents Law creates inequality between various
NGOs depending on their financing, with neither foreign financing
nor participation in “political activities” being prohibited.135 Justice
Yaroslavstev opined that the term “foreign agent” carries with it a
negative connotation designed to elicit a negative public reaction to
those qualifying NGOs.136 Equality and political pluralism are
constitutionally guaranteed in the Russian Federation, so foreignfunded NGOs should be able to participate in political activities on the
same terms as NGOs not receiving such financing, regardless of their
opinions about governmental policies.137 Freedom of association
presupposes not only the creation of such associations, but also their
functions, including participation in activities that are directed at
peacefully advancing ideas that will not be positively received by either
Id. at ¶ 3.1.
Id. at ¶ 3.1.
131
Id. at ¶ 4.
132
Id. at ¶ 4.
133
Id. at ¶ 4.
134
Id. at ¶ 4.
135
Id. at ¶ 3.1.
136
Id. at ¶ 5.
137
Po Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionosti Polodzenii Punkta 6 Stat’yi 2 i
Punkta 7 Stat’yi 32 Federal’nogo Zakona [On the Matter of Constitutionality of Art.
2(6) and Art. 32(7) of the Fed. Law], Konst. Sud RF [RF Const. Court] 2014, No.
10, ¶ 6.
129
130
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the government or the majority of the population. 138 Such tolerance
and pluralism is the cornerstone of democracy.139 Provisions of the
Foreign Agents Law violate a number of constitutional principles, such
as political and ideological pluralism, freedom of association, equality
before the law, and protection of personal dignity.140
Case analysis reveals that the majority opinion of the Russian
Constitutional Court arguably fails to address many of the criticisms
that were levelled at various provisions of the Russian Foreign Agents
Law, particularly the vagueness of the term “political activity,” the
pejorative designation of “foreign agent,” and the inclusion of all types
and amounts of foreign financing.141 The majority cited the need to
ensure transparency as the key reason for creating a regime for NGOs
to register as “foreign agents.”142 However, the majority failed to
explain the necessity for creating this new onerous registration regime
when legislative provisions aimed at ensuring transparency in NGO
activities and financing already exist under Russian law.143 Clearly,
rather than ensuring greater transparency, the government’s aim in
creating a registry of “foreign agents” was to assert greater control over
foreign-funded NGOs participating in transnational advocacy
networks, as well as to create barriers inhibiting their effective
operation.144 Although the majority rightly pointed out that neither
participation in political activities nor receiving foreign financing has
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶ 6.
140
Id. at ¶ 6.
141
Viktor K. Mihailov, Kriticheskii Vzglyad na Pozitsiu Konstitutionnogo Suda po
Usloviyam Priznaniya Nekommercheskoi Organizatsii Inostrannym Agentom, 1 PRAVO I
SOVREMENNYE GOSUDARSTVA 17, 24-26 (2015).
142
Id. at 20.
143
See generally Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Nekommercheskih Organizatsiyah
[Fed. Law of the Russian Fed’n on Non-commercial Org.s] Jan. 12, 1996, No. 7, Art.
32; See also Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Obshestvennih Obyiedzineniah [Fed. Law of the
Russian Fed’n on Civil Soc’y Org.s], May 19, 1995, No. 82, Art. 42, 44 (giving the
government control and oversight over all activities and finances of NGOs); See also
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Protivodeistvii Legalizatsii (Otmivaniiu) Dohodov,
Poluchennih Prestupnim Putiom, i Finansirovaniiu Terorizma [Fed. Law of the
Russian Fed’n On Combatting Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism], Aug.
7, 2001, No.115, Art. 6 (establishing strict measures to ensure transparency of foreign
sources of financing).
144
Mihailov, supra note 141, at 22.
138
139
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been prohibited by the Foreign Agents Law, the majority failed to
address the serious impediments that the Foreign Agents Law imposes
on NGOs.145 Justice Yaroslavtsev’s dissent rightly challenges the key
conclusions of the majority by pointing out the vagueness of various
terms contained in the Foreign Agents Law and contesting the
proclaimed neutrality of the designation of “foreign agent.”146
B. U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Meese v. Keene (1987)
In defending the Russian Foreign Agents Law, Russian
government officials repeatedly reference international precedents,
with a particular emphasis on the Foreign Agents Registration Act
(FARA) which supposedly contains provisions similar to the Russian
law.147 A closer examination of both FARA and the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Meese v. Keene dealing with the constitutionality of
“political propaganda” provisions in FARA148 and the resulting
amendments reveals that “fine details” frequently get “lost in
translation when comparing judicial systems” across different
jurisdictions, and “can be used strategically to advance specific national
political goals.”149 On April 28, 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court in Meese
v. Keene considered the constitutionality of the term “political
propaganda,” which was contained in FARA.150 FARA used this
particular term to identify materials subject to its requirements, and
defined the term as a “‘communication or expression’”151 that is
intended to
prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way
influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United
States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or
relations of a government or a foreign country or a foreign political

145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Vasilenko, supra note 80, at 47. See Kupina, supra note 72, at 45.
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 465 (1987).
Popkova, supra note 11, at 3071.
Meese, 481 U.S. at 465.
Id. at 471–72 (quoting Section 611(j) of FARA).
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party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United
States. . . .152
Appellee Keene, who was a member of the California State
Senate, wanted to show three Canadian films about acid rain and
nuclear war that the United States Department of Justice had identified
as “political propaganda” under FARA.153 However, the appellee did
not want to be publicly regarded as a disseminator of political
propaganda, as dictated by the mandatory disclosure requirements that
demand that those viewing the films be informed that the films are
identified as “political propaganda.”154 The appellee was concerned
with the impact on his reputation, in light of the public reaction to
materials to which the terms “political propaganda” applies. 155 The
District Court for the Eastern District of California asserted that the
label “political propaganda” has the effect of making the public believe
that the material has been “officially censured” and is pejorative and
unnecessary, thus constituting an unconstitutional abridgment of free
speech.156 The District Court concluded that the term “propaganda”
was a “semantically slanted word of reprobation. . . .”157 Thus, labelling
expressive materials as “political propaganda” rendered them
unavailable to citizens who wanted to “use them as a means of personal
expression.”158 The District Court further concluded that there was
“no compelling state interest to justify the use of such a pejorative
label. . . .”159 Thus, continuing to label expressive materials “political
propaganda” was an “invalid . . . abridgment of speech.”160
Despite the judgment of the District Court, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that FARA’s use of the term “political propaganda” was
constitutional.161 The Supreme Court commenced its reasoning by

152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 471–72 (quoting Section 611(j) of FARA).
Meese, 481 U.S. at 467.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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referencing the overall regulatory scheme of FARA. 162 The Court
stated that the main purpose of the regulatory scheme was
to protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign
relations of the United States by requiring public disclosure by persons
engaging in propaganda activities and other activities for or on behalf
of foreign governments, foreign political parties, and other foreign
principals so that the Government and the people of the United States
may be informed of the identity of such persons and may appraise their
statements and actions in the light of their associations and activities.163
In other words, FARA is directed at protecting national
security and ensuring transparency among those who act for or on
behalf of foreign interests. Thus, FARA “requires all agents of foreign
principals to file detailed registration statements. . . .”164 Such
registration requirements apply “equally to agents of friendly, neutral,
and unfriendly governments,”165 who in turn must label all materials
that have been classified as “political propaganda,” for the reason that
“they contain political material intended to influence the foreign
policies of the United States. . . .”166
The Supreme Court noted that FARA defined the term
“political propaganda” as including not only slanted and “misleading
advocacy,” but also advocacy materials that are accurate and deserve
the “highest respect.”167 Thus, the statutory definition encompasses
both neutral and pejorative meanings.168 Among other things, the
Court then pointed out that FARA neither prohibits access to materials
labelled “political propaganda,” nor the distribution of such
materials.169 The District Court erroneously and paternalistically
assumed that public reaction to the label “political propaganda” would
be overwhelmingly negative, so the District Court decided that it

162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id.
Id. (quoting 56 Stat. 248–49).
Meese, 481 U.S. at 469.
Id. at 469–70.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 477–478.
Id. at 478–85.
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would be best to protect the public from “too much information” in
order to prevent misunderstanding and misuse.170 The Supreme Court
proposed an alternative to the District Court’s erroneous paternalism:
“‘to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to the end is to open the channels
of communication rather than to close them. . . .’”171 The Supreme
Court ultimately held that FARA did not impermissibly restrict free
speech and was thus constitutional.172
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented in part, and stated that the majority formed its opinion
regarding the term “political propaganda” as neutral by “limiting its
examination to the statutory definition of the term and by ignoring the
realities of public reaction to the designation.”173 Justice Blackmun
stated that even the limited definition of “political propaganda”
contained in FARA could not be regarded as neutral: according to the
legislative history of FARA, Congress intended to “discourage
communications by foreign agents.”174 The dissenting justices stated
that even if Congress defined the term “political propaganda” in
“completely neutral” terms, it would not necessarily amount to
sufficient protection of freedom of speech.175 According to the dissent,
the majority was too dismissive of the “‘potential misunderstanding of
[the statute’s] effect.’”176 Hence, the statute’s “‘practical effect’” and its
potential to “‘discourage protected speech’” must be considered.177
In this particular case, the appellee did “not argue that his
speech [was] deterred by” FARA’s “political propaganda” definition,
but the appellee did argue that “his speech [was] deterred by” how the
material that had been designated as “political propaganda” was
Id. at 481–82.
Id. at 482 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
172
Meese, 481 U.S. at 485.
173
Id. at 485–86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 486.
175
Id. at 488.
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Id. (quoting the majority opinion at 478; alteration in original).
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Id. at 488–89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986)).
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perceived by the public.178 The appellee submitted expert testimony
that:
the designation “political propaganda” of a film or book by the
government is pejorative, denigrating to the material, and stigmatizing
to those disseminating it . . . to call something propaganda is to assert
that it communicates hidden or deceitful ideas; that concealed interests
are involved; that unfair or insidious methods [are] being
employed. . . .179
This expert testimony was unrebutted, and the dissent felt that
this testimony indicated that the majority erroneously concluded that
“‘propaganda’” is a “neutral classification.”180According to the dissent,
“an unjustifiably narrow view of the sort of government action that
can violate” free speech was adopted by the majority and the majority
ignored the practical effects of materials being classified as “political
propaganda.”181 The practical effects of such a classification “create an
indirect burden on expression.”182 The dissent added that “indirect
discouragements are fully capable of a coercive effect on
speech. . . .”183 Designation as “political propaganda” taints a material’s
message, puts individuals and organizations wishing to display such
materials on the defensive, and has a “‘deterrent and “chilling” effect
on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech,
expression, and association.’”184 While the majority classified the
approach by the lower District Court as “paternalistic,” the dissenting
justices concluded that the governmental classification of materials as
“political propaganda” is what is paternalistic.185 The dissenting justices
stated that

Meese, 481 U.S. at 489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 490 (quoting a statement from “Leonard W. Doob, Sterling
Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Yale University”).
180
Meese, 481 U.S. at 490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181
Id. at 490–91.
182
Id. at 490.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 492 (quoting Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539, 557 (1963)).
185
Id. at 493.
178
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[g]overnment action does more than simply provide
additional information. It places the power of the
Federal Government, with its authority, presumed
neutrality, and assumed access to all the facts, behind
an appellation designed to reduce the effectiveness of the
speech in the eyes of the public.186
The dissenting justices found that labelling materials as
“political propaganda” constituted an unconstitutional infringement
on rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.187 Ultimately, the dissenting justices won the day, for
Section 611(j) of FARA defining the term “political propaganda” was
later repealed in 1995.188
III. “LOST IN TRANSLATION”: COMPARING THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN
EXPERIENCE
While Russian legislators frequently reference FARA as
precedent for the Russian Foreign Agents Law, upon closer
examination, unlike the Russian legislation, FARA primarily
emphasizes the existence of an “agency relationship” between a
domestic organization and its foreign principal. 189 A high standard of
proof must be satisfied in order to prove that the agency relationship

Meese, 481 U.S. at 493 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 496.
188
The term “political propaganda” was specifically removed from FARA
in 1995 and replaced with the more neutral term of “informational materials,” Pub.
L. No. 104-65, § 9, 109 Stat. 691, 699–700 (1995), thus removing the potential
negative perceptions associated with the term propaganda, as was discussed by the
dissenting justices in Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 485–96 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
189
Yuk K. Law, The Foreign Agents Registration Act: A New Standard for
Determining Agency, 6 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 365, 370 (1982) (stating that “[a]gents of
foreign principals have the duty to fulfill FARA’s requirements if they engage in
political activities. . . . [t]o trigger the registration requirement under FARA, an
agency relationship must exist between an American representative and a foreign
interest.”).
186
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exists.190 Additionally, in Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc.,191 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that
in determining whether any set of facts establishes that
someone is acting as an agent for a foreign principal within the
meaning of the Act it is important to consider the limitations on types
of activity Congress intended to reach. Congress was particularly
concerned that registration would not be imposed to stifle internal
debate on political issues by citizens sympathetic to the views of
foreigners but free from foreign direction or control. In amending the
definition of agent in 1966 Congress emphasized that the Act should
not require the registration “of persons who are not, in fact, agents of
foreign principals but whose acts may incidentally be of benefit to
foreign interests, even though such acts are part of the normal course
of those persons’ own rights of free speech, petition or assembly.” 192
Furthermore, the scope of the regulated activity under FARA
is much narrower than the Russian Foreign Agents Law, for FARA is
mostly concerned with lobbying, consultancy, and advertising. 193 Most

See United States v. German-American Vocational League, 153 F. 2d 860
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760 (1946). The prosecution must satisfy a high burden
of proof to prove the existence of the agency relationship. See United States v. Syed
Ghulam Nabi Fai (2011) Criminal Case No 1:11 – CR -00561-LO, Plea Agreement
(the prosecution provided proof that Kashmiri American Council (KAC) was under
a complete and total control of the Pakistani governmental structures that regularly
provided instructions to KAC and engaged in direct planning of KAC’s activities).
See also O.B. Sidorovich & G.B. Vaipan, Zakluchenie o rezultatah sravnitelno-pravovogo
analiza Federalnogo zakona at 20 iulya 2012 goda N.121-FZ “O Vnesenii Izmenenii v
Otdelnye Zakonodatelnye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v chasti regulirovaniya deyatelnosti
nekommercheskih organizatsii, vypolnyauschih funktsii inostrannogo agenta” I Zakona SSHA
“O registratsii inostrannyh agentov” (Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. 611-621) ot
Avtonomnoi nekommercheskoi nepravitelstvennoi organizatsii, INSTITUT PRAVA I
PUBLICHNOI POLITIKI, Feb. 28, 2014 at ¶ 13.
191
Attorney Gen. of the United States v. Irish People, Inc., 796 F.2d 520
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
192
Id. at 524 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1470, 89th Cong.2d Sess. 5-6 (1966),
reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News. 2397, 2401).
193
Sidorovich & Vaipan, supra note 190, at ¶ 3.
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actions of Russian NGOs that are captured under the Russian Foreign
Agents Law would not be captured under FARA.194
Comparing the corresponding decisions of Russian and U.S.
courts can also be helpful. In their respective cases, both the Russian
and U.S. courts state that the terms at issue were neutral and thus did
not violate the constitutional rights of those trying to deal with these
designations by impeding their functions. Both courts reference
governmental purposes of protecting national security and ensuring
transparency. However, one key difference between the Russian
Constitutional Court ruling and the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Meese
v. Keene is the emphasis on agency relationships in the U.S. case and the
absence thereof from the Russian case.195 In its current form, FARA is
directed towards a very limited number of organizations that are
mostly engaged in lobbying activity and are acting as agents of foreign
principals.196 The Russian Foreign Agents Law targets different
organizations than FARA.197 FARA requirements were clearly meant
to apply only to those who were acting as agents of foreign principals,
rather than those who sympathized and even promoted “foreign”
views but were not agents of foreign principals. The judgment of the
majority of the Russian Constitutional Court indicates that controlling
and suppressing “foreign views” was the key aim of the Russian
state.198
While the majority opinions of both Russian and U.S. Courts
contain similar reasoning, the dissenting opinions are also very
informative, as they challenge the notion of the “neutrality” of the
designations and consider the actual impact of the use of the terms
“political propaganda” or “foreign agent.”199 Both dissents discuss the
“tainted message” that follows these designations, and the resulting
“chilling effect” of these provisions on freedoms of association and

Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25.
Meese, 481 U.S. at 469.
196
Sidorovich & Vaipan, supra note 190, at ¶ 3.
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See Osoboe Mnenie [Dissenting Opinion], supra note 118, ¶ 5.
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Mihailov, supra note 141, at 22.
199
Meese, 481 U.S. at 485–86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Osoboe Mnenie
[Dissenting Opinion], supra note 118, ¶ 5.
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speech.200 Both dissenting opinions emphasize that the freedoms of
speech and association protect opinions and actions, regardless of
whether the government or even the population supports those
opinions and acts. Such is the nature of a pluralistic democratic society.
Furthermore, these unpopular points of view cannot be shut down by
either direct or indirect means.
IV. “FOREIGN AGENTS” AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Given the 2014 decision of the Russian Constitutional Court
confirming the constitutionality of various provisions of the Russian
Foreign Agents Law, as well as subsequent amendments that made it
even harder for the Russian NGOs that receive foreign funding to
participate in political activities, in March of 2018, forty-eight Russian
NGOs that were classified as “foreign agents” filed a complaint in
front of the European Court of Human Rights. 201 In their complaint
to the Strasbourg Court, the NGOs emphasized the lack of a
requirement of an agency relationship between Russian NGOs and
foreign donors in the Russian law; the all-encompassing nature of
foreign financing; the vagueness of the term “political activity;” the
lack of guidance in labelling materials produced by NGOs that have
been designated as “foreign agents;” and the lack of proportionality of
governmental measures.202 The complainants asserted that the current
requirements of the Foreign Agents Law make seeking foreign
financing very difficult for NGOs, even though domestic financing is
frequently quite limited.203 Furthermore, provisions dealing with
“political activity” effectively reduce NGOs’ dialogue with the
government.204 Overall, the NGOs argued that the real governmental

200
Meese, 481 U.S. at. at 488–89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986)); Osoboe Mnenie
[Dissenting Opinion], supra note 118, ¶ 6.
201
See generally Ekozaschita et al. v. Russia, App. No. 9988/13, (March 12,
2018), (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.).
202
Id. at summary.
203
Id.
204
Id.
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aim behind this legislation was not to increase transparency, but rather
to shut down dissenting views. 205
The massive demonstrations protesting election falsification in
the winter of 2011–12 and NGOs’ active involvement in election
monitoring resulted in a “political counter-offensive from the
government. . . .”206 This effort culminated in the passage of the
Foreign Agents Law, among other measures, in 2012. The key aims of
the law are to cut off Russian NGOs from foreign funding and any
sort of “political activity.”207 In other words, “the NGO Law has had
the effect of ‘crowding out’ the civic sphere organisations that are
critical of the authorities, supplanting these groups with organisations
that are neutral or loyal to the regime.”208 The term “foreign agent”
itself is a “throwback to espionage accusations during the Cold War”209
and was deliberately chosen to discredit and stigmatize foreign-funded
NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks. 210 Politically
active advocacy networks have been gradually replaced by politically
neutral social groups as a result of the government’s efforts.211 NGOs
that want to continue operating in the political realm are forced to not
only give up their foreign funding, but also to take account of the
political risks inherent in this shift from foreign to domestic—largely
government—financing.212 Many realized that in order to access
governmental funds, they would have to adopt a less critical stance.213
This, in turn, created friction between NGOs loyal to the government
and those critical of the government, leading to concerns about the
“future quality of Russia’s governance” in a sociopolitical environment
not openly critical of the government.214 Furthermore, citizens might
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Daucé, supra note 2, at 63.
207
Id. at 64.
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Leah Gilbert, Crowding Out Civil Society: State Management of Social
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not participate as actively in policy work if the NGOs with which they
would previously partner can no longer advocate critically. 215
CONCLUSION
While national security undoubtedly constitutes a key
governmental goal, it cannot overshadow rights. In other words,
human security may be a precondition to liberty, but it
should not be valued above liberty for, when so
weighted, it is capable of destroying liberty. A society
that exaggerates its security requirements can debase
the values it cherishes. Free societies accept less
security and, consequently endure some pain and
suffering, in order to emphasize their humanity and
civility.216
Even though rights do expand and contract in relation to
changing circumstances,217 arguably, they cannot be contracted to the
point of making them meaningless, which is precisely what the Russian
Foreign Agents Law aims to do. Once laws are enacted, they greatly
influence their subjects by shaping their political choices and
standardizing behavior.218 The enactment of the Russian Foreign
Agents Law was meant to reshape NGOs’ activist practices by
stigmatizing their international cooperation and participation in
political activities as well as transnational advocacy networks. 219 The
law reshaped the nature of domestic interactions and impacted
interactions within transnational networks, where global partners have
been forced to adapt their approaches to the restrictive legislative
provisions if they choose to continue working with Russian partners.220
Thus, the law itself, as well as its interpretations through judicial
See id. at 1574.
Stanley A. Cohen, Law in a Fearful Society: How Much Security?, 54 U. NEW
BRUNSWICK L. J. 143, 146–47 (2005).
217
Id. at 147.
218
Françoise Daucé, The Government and Human Rights Groups in Russia?
Civilized Oppression?, 10 J. CIV. SOC’Y 239, 247 (2014).
219
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See Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, & Henry, supra note 15, at 616.
215
216

415

2019

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

7:2

rulings, becomes a constraining mechanism nationally as well as
internationally.221 Challenging the law in various judicial realms, be they
domestic constitutional courts or international adjudicative bodies,
while useful in making the arguments of all sides transparent, also
softens the “direct combat between activists and the state.”222 This
“juridification” of the issues, while reducing violence, also depoliticizes the nature of the interactions by forcing the parties into the
frameworks of legal arguments.223 Ultimately, this de-politicization
reflects the decline of political pluralism in Russia. 224 The Foreign
Agents Law is yet another element in this overall trend.
While national security and ensuring transparency are laudable
goals, they are frequently misused to accomplish ulterior aims. In
Russia, provisions of the Foreign Agents Law have been utilized to
stifle internal debates and dissenting views, particularly when such
views are critical of the state and sympathetic to so-called “Western
ideas.” Individuals and organizations expressing such views have now
been legislatively ostracized, marginalized, and presented as posing an
existential threat to Russia itself. 225 The Russian Constitutional Court
itself has contributed to this delegitimization. The narrative of national
security has become increasingly difficult to challenge either
domestically or internationally, ultimately making the change “from
values of survival to values of self-expression less likely.”226
Challenging the Foreign Agents Law at the level of the European
Court of Human Rights is only useful to the point that the Strasbourg
Court’s future ruling will be accepted and implemented by Russia. 227
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This is an uncertain outcome, given Russia’s recent tense relationship
with the European Court of Human Rights and refusal to implement
the Strasbourg Court’s decisions when those decisions are deemed to
contradict Russian constitutional principles.228 Russia needs to engage
in a wholesale rethinking of the notion of national security itself—a
notion that includes social, economic, and human rights concerns.
Only such a reconceptualization will allow NGOs to be viewed as
partners, rather than enemies, in ensuring national security.
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